Kantian Nonideal Theory and Nuclear Proliferation by Doyle, Ii, Thomas E.
International Theory (2010), 2:1, 87–112 & Cambridge University Press, 2010
doi:10.1017/S1752971909990248
Kantian nonideal theory and nuclear
proliferation
T H O M A S E . D O Y L E I I *
Department of Political Science, School of Social Science, University of California,
3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA
Recent revelations of Iran’s hitherto undisclosed uranium enrichment programs
have once again incited western fears that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons’
capability. Their fears seem motivated by more than the concern for compliance
with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Rather, they seem strongly
connected to the western moral assumptions about what kind of government or
people can be trusted with a nuclear arsenal. In this paper, I critically examine
the western assumptions of the immorality of contemporary nuclear proliferation
from an international ethical stance that otherwise might be expected to give it
unequivocal support – the stance of Kantian nonideal theory. In contrast to the
uses of Kant that were prominent during the Cold War, I advance and apply
a sketch of a Kantian nonideal theory that specifies the conditions (although
strict conditions) under which nuclear proliferation for states like Iran is
morally permissible even though the NPT forbids it.
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‘Necessity cannot cancel morality’. Immanuel Kant (1963: 157)
Recent revelations of Iran’s hitherto undisclosed uranium enrichment
programs have once again incited western – and in particular American –
fears that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons’ capability. The broad consensus
of American and other western policymakers, as reflected in the public
media, is that the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran will lead to pro-
liferation escalation among neighboring states, which in turn increases
regional instability. The western reaction has been to call for negotiations
in which the Iranian government would agree to forestall further uranium
enrichment. Failing that, they have pushed for increased economic
sanctions at United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sessions, although
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Russia and China have so far resisted these pressures.1 And while the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) proscribes any new spread of
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states’ parties, the fear of Iranian nuclear
weaponization seems motivated by more than the concern for treaty
compliance. Rather, it appears to be motivated strongly by western moral
assumptions about what kind of government or people can be trusted
with a nuclear arsenal.2
In this paper, I want to critically examine these implicit western
assumptions of the immorality of contemporary nuclear proliferation
from an international ethical stance that otherwise might be expected to
give it unequivocal support – the stance of Kantian nonideal theory. I will
argue that there are conditions (although strict conditions) where nuclear
proliferation for states like Iran is morally permissible even though the
NPT forbids it. In what follows, I introduce and discuss, in the first
section, the relevance of Kantian nonideal theory for this issue. In the
second and third sections, I briefly review the first generation of Kantian
nuclear ethics that drew exclusively on Kant’s ideal theory. In the fourth
and fifth sections, I identify two separate resources, respectively, for a
Kantian nonideal theory in order to apply and defend it in the sixth
section. The seventh section is a conclusion with brief remarks on the
implications of my argument.
Nuclear proliferation and the relevance of Kantian nonideal
moral theory
The contemporary problem of nuclear proliferation is a paradigm case for
nonideal moral theory, which is concerned with normativity in contexts
where compliance with law or duty cannot be assumed or is not forth-
coming (Rawls, 1971; Schapiro, 2003). The United States and its allies,
for instance, regard Iran’s secret enrichment programs as NPT treaty
violations. In turn, many non-nuclear weapon states claim that the
nuclear powers have failed to honor their NPT commitments to move in
good faith toward complete nuclear disarmament (Doyle, 2009b). In
partial reaction to this latter complaint, Hobbesian-leaning commentators
have argued that moral obligation is binding on states only if mutual or
reciprocal recognition of agreements or promises can be reasonably
1 This description represents the situation in late 2009. For a comparison of the develop-
ments during the October–November period, see Sanger (2009) and Slackman (2009).
2 Thus, it might be that German or even Turkish nuclear proliferation (although unlikely)
might not arouse the same kind of concerns among American policymakers that North Korean
or suspected Iranian proliferation has.
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expected.3 In their view, the kind of anarchy that constitutes the present
international system does not provide such an expectation,4 and so for
them the necessity principle does (and should) trump moral considera-
tions in matters of existential threat (Sagan, 2004) or ‘supreme emer-
gencies’ (Walzer, [1977] 2000) that the Iranian case seems to exemplify.
If this view is correct, it follows that an international security or nuclear
ethics is impractical at best and dangerous at worst.
Two compelling counterarguments, however, can be advanced to this
point. First, certain prominent scholars have for some time regarded
nuclear warfighting and deterrence as topics for moral scrutiny.5 During
the Cold War, Nye’s Nuclear Ethics (1986) was the premier monograph
on this point. His main focus was American nuclear weapon policy
toward the Soviet Union, and one of his main concerns was to correct
what he thought was the myopia of two kinds of political moralism. He
resisted idealist leaning nuclear ethics that emphasized right action
independent of the common good. Nye thus rejected pacifist and
Kantian nuclear ethics, along with their calls for unilateral nuclear
disarmament. On the other hand, he refused to sublimate moral con-
cerns about nuclear policy entirely to the national interest. Nye argued
that individuals and states have important moral obligations to for-
eigners, especially to reduce the risk of harm to innocent third parties.
Nye’s five nuclear–ethical maxims accordingly incorporate duty-based
and consequentialist approaches while emphasizing the latter: (1) self-
defense is a just but limited cause; (2) never treat nuclear weapons as
normal weapons; (3) minimize harm to innocent people; (4) reduce risks
of nuclear war in the near term; and (5) reduce reliance on nuclear
weapons over time.6 If Nye and others across the realist–idealist con-
tinuum recognized the relevance of nuclear ethics during the Cold War,
the case for its relevance to post-Cold War nuclear proliferation can be
reasonably made.
3 For example, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer’s work implicitly advances what the
late Hobbesian scholar Greg Kavka explicitly argues in his 1986 book. See Kavka (1986). The
relevant discussion relates to Hobbes’s claim that natural law binds in foro interno, rather than
the in foro externo nature of positive law.
4 The debate is if the present international system reflects Hobbesian or Lockean anarchy.
In the former, moral principles do not hold at all. In the latter, some moral principles hold, but
not in the way Kant would claim they do. I take the term ‘Lockean anarchy’ from Wendt
(1999). See also, Bull (1977) and Lebow (2003).
5 See, e.g. Nagel (1972); Kavka (1978); Churchill (1983); Kavka (1983); Donaldson (1985);
Lee (1985); McMahan (1985); Tucker (1985).
6 For an explication of these maxims, see Nye (1986), 99ff. For Nye’s views against the two
extremes of political moralism, see especially his chapters 4 and 5.
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Second, it is a mistake to reduce or confine post-Cold War non-
proliferation policy to matters of strategic or technological rationality.
Thomas Schelling argued that ‘the emphasis (of nonproliferation studies
and policy) has to shift from physical denial and technology secrecy to the
things that determine incentives and expectations’ (quoted in Solingen,
2007). If Schelling is right, the focus of American policy should not
continue to emphasize the regulation or containment of flows of nuclear
materials and technologies to non-nuclear-weapon states. Instead, it
should address the state- or regime-level insecurities and humiliations that
provide reason for nuclear-threshold states to abandon nonproliferation
commitments (see, e.g. Campbell et al., 2004; Hymans, 2006; Solingen,
2007; Doyle, 2009a, b). It should recognize that nuclear aspirant
motivations are in turn framed by particular moral psychologies, both
religious and secular (see, e.g. Hashmi and Lee, 2004; Hymans, 2006).
The values expressed by these beliefs are themselves anchored to diverse
ethical commitments about the collective good, natural and political
rights, and obligations that attend international legal agreements. The
sources of these conceptions are outside the domestic and international
law (even if such law expresses them). Likewise, it should recognize that
moral beliefs anchor the non- and counterproliferation proposals and
policies put forward by countries such as the United States (Doyle,
2009a). It is thus reasonable to recognize that nuclear weapons and/or
nonproliferation policy ought to not be framed by this dubious distinction
between necessity and morality.
Taking a recent cue from Ken Booth (2007), I therefore contend that
problems of nuclear proliferation ought to be approached as problems of
political/moral theory as much as problems of strategy or technology.
And, in a move that tries to correct one strand of the Cold War nuclear
ethics literature, I maintain that this analysis should not rely exclusively
on the principles of ideal moral theory, whose (mis)applications reinforce
the perception that morality is irrelevant to politics. Instead, it should
carefully consider those nonideal moral principles whose aim is to alle-
viate national, regional or global insecurity, and/or realize a greater
measure of international justice while not insisting that each and every
injustice is addressed all at once.
To say that contemporary nuclear proliferation is a paradigm case
for nonideal moral theory, then, is to recognize generally how the formal
is dependent upon the informal. In particular, it is to see how NPT
violations can threaten to undo an important informal norm – that is,
the nuclear taboo (see e.g. Bunn, 2006; Chyba et al., 2006; Bakanic,
2008). It recognizes also that morality permits states to do that which
is otherwise impermissible in order to prevent greater injustices from
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happening.7 Accordingly, the most relevant question to pose is: to what
extent might nonideal moral principles permit leaders of any non-
nuclear weapon state to violate a voluntarily assumed legal obligation to
refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons? I take it that this question is
best addressed by Kantian nonideal theory.
Some might wonder ‘why Kant?’ Otfried Hoffe (2006) argues that
Kant is the only ‘great thinker’ to put peace among states and peoples as
a fundamental principle of philosophy. Moreover, Kant is regarded as
taking an unusually rigorous moral approach. We might thus expect
Kant to insist on adherence to ideal principles in all cases, entailing an
unequivocal opposition to nuclear proliferation and a corresponding
requirement that all states undertake unilateral and global nuclear dis-
armament without condition. Indeed, idealist leaning nuclear ethicists
during the Cold War interpreted Kant in this way (Donaldson, 1985;
Lee, 1985; McMahan, 1985). However, they overlooked those parts
of Kant’s writings that comprise a less than fully articulated nonideal
theory, including Perpetual Peace (PP), Lectures on Ethics (LE), portions
of the Metaphysics of Morals (MM) and Religion within the Limits
of Reason Alone (Religion). Their mistake was to apply the more
familiar and ideal elements of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals (GMM), the Critique of Practical Reason (CPR2) and Kant’s
late and notorious essay On the Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy
(RTL) to the problem of nuclear deterrence in which none of the
assumptions of ideal theory relevantly apply (Kant, 1785, 1793, 1795,
1797a, 1797b).
If, however, a Kantian nonideal theory can be adequately sketched and
validly applied to the problem of contemporary nuclear proliferation, a
significant correction can be made to the dominant accounts that over
emphasize or misapply his ideal moral principles. Second, the corre-
sponding relevance of morality for politics and political inquiry might
be rehabilitated (once more).8 Third, a certain methodological parsimony
is achieved. If Kantian nonideal theory concludes that Iranian nuclear
proliferation is permissible under certain strict conditions, we should
expect other less rigorous moral theories to be capable of similar
accommodations. Finally, if the explication is successful, it would follow
that some instances of nuclear proliferation are not inconsistent with
Kant’s ultimate vision of achieving perpetual peace.
7 For a more comprehensive argument on the value of theory in nonideal circumstances, see
Swift (2007).
8 For a compelling argument that Hans Morgenthau rescued morality for realist IR theory,
see Williams (2005).
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Contrasting political problems for nuclear ethics
Since its inception, the nuclear ethics literature has been primarily concerned
with the morality of nuclear warfare and deterrence. Kantian approaches
begin with the proscription on annihilating states in war (MM, 6:347; LE,
214)9 or engaging in the kinds of hostile military actions that undermines
the possibility of constructing a durable peace (PP, 8:346). From these
principles, it is not difficult to infer that Kantian theory proscribes any form
of massive or extensive nuclear attack. However, since not all war-related
uses of nuclear weapons entail the annihilation of states (Quester, 2006), the
theory’s main practical concern is with the problem of trust building between
warring states. If any nuclear first-use is highly likely to trigger a cascade of
nuclear retaliatory strikes, its use will almost assuredly prevent the kind of
trust necessary for constructing a durable peace (Quester, 2006).
Likewise, the strategy of nuclear deterrence seems inconsistent with the
duty of interstate trust building. In the 1980s, Kantians were almost
unanimous in condemning nuclear deterrence,10 even though many realist
leaning scholars claimed that it secured great power peace (see Sagan,
2004). However, particular instances of nuclear proliferation (e.g. French,
Indian, and Pakistani) which were not linked to the Cold War superpower
rivalry reveal the degree to which mistrust pervades regional rivalries (e.g.
France vs. Germany in the 1950s, India vs. Pakistan in the 1990s; see
Tertrais, 2003; Hymans, 2006; Smith, 2006; Way, 2007). And assuming
that aspirant leaders’ public policy justifications reflect their genuine
(while admittedly politicized) nuclear motivations, it is reasonable to
think that they believe ‘right’ is on their side. Consider remarks by former
Iranian President Rafsanjani in 1988:
ywith regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons
training, it was made very clear during the [Iraq–Iran] war that these
weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral
teachings of the world are not very effective when war reaches a serious
stage and the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its
eyes to the violations and all the aggressions, which are committed on
the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and
9 The pagination used in the parenthetical citations refers to the system developed and used
for Kant’s works in all their editions and translations by the Royal Prussian Academy of
Sciences. In all contemporary editions, these volume and page numbers appear in the margins
of the text.
10 However, to the extent that John Rawls is considered to be a Kantian, his qualified
acceptance of nuclear deterrence against ‘outlaw states’ is a notable exception (see Rawls,
1999).
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defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons
(quoted in Solingen, 2007: 165–166).
Rafsanjani’s statement is couched in the context of the Sunni–Shi’a
rivalry elevated to an international level.11 Saddam Hussein’s use of
chemical weapons in the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88, in violation of the
chemical weapons taboo (Price, 1997), prompted Iran’s leaders to com-
plain to the UNSC (Ansari, 2006). On their view, Saddam’s actions
constituted war crimes. Yet, largely due to American hostility to Iran’s
clerical regime following the 1979 capture of the US embassy in Tehran,
the UNSC remained silent about Saddam’s use of chemical weapons. That
Iraq had a fledgling and illegal nuclear weapons program was common
knowledge by 1988 (Solingen, 2007: Ch. 7). As a signatory to the NPT,
Iranian leaders appeared to be trapped in a dilemma. If international law
does not yet govern uses of certain ‘tabooed’ weapon systems,12 and if
collective security institutions are deaf to invocations of international
norms in a ‘supreme emergency’, the only right course of action appears
to be what is legally and morally impermissible. As Rafsanjani’s statement
reflects, some of Iran’s key leaders concluded that nuclear weapons would
constitute the only effective deterrent against hostile Sunni states, Israel,
and the United States.13 If international efforts to prevent Iran from
continuing its uranium enrichment programs fail, it will likely be because
the Ayatollah Khameini and President Ahmadinejad remain convinced
that political and moral right is on their side (Doyle, 2009a: Chs. 3 and 4).
Were the Iranians to succeed in nuclear weaponization, some interna-
tional security scholars believe that a proliferation cascade might engulf
the Middle East, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia likely being the first in line
(see, e.g. Einhorn, 2004). And even though Turkish officials resolutely
deny having nuclear ambitions, a nuclear Iran makes it much more likely
for Turkey to seek its own nuclear deterrent.14 One often overlooked link
between the morality and the politics of these frightening possibilities can
be discovered in an analysis of nationalism.
11 A comprehensive account of the Sunni–Shi’a Rivalry internationalized can be found in
Nasr (2007).
12 The Chemical Weapons Convention had not yet been constructed. See Price (1997).
13 In making this argument, I am not claiming that the Iranian government’s only or ulti-
mate motivation to pursue nuclear weapons was to deter Iraq and other hostile Sunni neigh-
bors.
14 In an off-the-record interview I conducted with a Turkish nonproliferation official in
Washington DC on 27 August 2008, Turkey’s official position is that they would never have
nuclear weapons ambitions. A dissenting view was expressed by an expert on Turkey, Professor
Jack Kangas (currently from Johns Hopkins University) by email. This official position is
challenged by Fuerth (2004) and Jack Kangas (private email correspondence).
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Nationalism is a political ideology that is framed by the moral
assumptions of state-egoism.15 One is that the obligations to one’s fellow
citizens override those owed to foreigners.16 Another is that nation–state
survival is an absolute imperative, taken to be equivalent to the (natural)
right of individual survival. Since aggression is the only kind of ‘crime’ in
international relations, all threats to nation–states must be seen as threats
of aggression, that is, security threats (Walzer, [1977] 2000: 51), and
nationalist moral assumptions smooth efforts at acquiring a nuclear
deterrent, even if greater insecurities come afterwards. Some might think
that these assumptions are invalidated or at least constrained by the pacta
sunt servanda norm in international law. Still, the rebus sic stantibus
provisions that inhere generally in all international treaties have the
effects of conditioning pacta sunt servanda to the principle of state
sovereignty.17 Thus, instead of regarding the necessity principle as con-
flicting with or originating outside of morality, it makes more sense to
regard necessity as a central maxim of nationalist morality (which is held
universally in today’s international system).
Kant, however, is not a nationalist. His orientation is cosmopolitan,
although his conception of a pacific federation retains the nation–state as a
necessary entity of world politics. We should expect Kantian cosmopoli-
tanism to weaken significantly the two above-mentioned assumptions of
nationalist morality. We might also expect a corresponding weakening of
the necessity principle, resulting in the proscription of nuclear proliferation
in (almost) every case. To examine this expectation more fully, it is useful to
recall the nuclear ethics debate over superpower nuclear deterrence before
exploring applications to our contemporary case.
Kantian ideal theory and nuclear deterrence
In the 1980s, Kantian-leaning theorists criticized superpower nuclear
deterrence based on various formulations of the Categorical Imperative
(Churchill, 1983; Donaldson, 1985; Lee, 1985). One formulation states,
‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, and never merely
15 A detailed account of the moral underpinnings of nationalism, or the ‘morality of states’,
is provided by Beitz ([1979] 1999).
16 This assumption regards the fellow citizen/foreigner relation as analogous to the family/
neighbor relation. Ceteris paribus, one’s obligations to one’s family members, is greater than to
one’s neighbors.
17 A good introduction to pacta sunt servanda and the rebus provision is in Bederman
(2006).
94 T H O M A S E . D O Y L E I I
as a means’ (GMM 4:429). This ‘Formula of Humanity’ prescribes an
ideal criterion for the assessment of rules for interpersonal and interna-
tional conduct (Korsgaard, 1996). It acknowledges that, in daily life, the
benefit of any individual’s talent or labor must often accrue to others, that
is, at times all individuals are treated as means for the ends of others. Even
so, the Categorical Imperative requires that any use of persons must be
consistent with a regard for human beings as ends in themselves, as having
autonomy and dignity. This requirement is applied by asking actors to
imagine in concrete cases of choice and action whether or not individuals
could in principle rationally consent to the uses imposed on them from which
they do not benefit. The important question to ask is whether the principles
governing the uses of humanity by nuclear deterrence institutions are con-
sistent with regarding self and others as an end and not merely as a means. I
will review in turn two such principles discussed in the Cold War nuclear
ethics literature – that is, the Wrongful Intentions Principle and the Principle
of the Morality of Social Institutions.
The Wrongful Intentions Principle dictates that it is wrong to intend to
do something that it is wrong to do. It is, for instance, wrong to murder or
kidnap others and it is wrong to intend to commit those acts. Accordingly,
the argument against nuclear deterrence by Kantians during the Cold War
is that (1) it is wrong to use people within national defense institutions to
carry out nuclear warfare and, hence, (2) it is wrong to issue threats to
other countries requiring the creation and administration of institutions
to carry out nuclear warfare if deterrence fails (Kavka, 1978; Tucker,
1985). Now, under ideal conditions, the need for nuclear (and perhaps
conventional) deterrence would not arise. But, under the kind of anarchy
that corresponds to the present world system (Bull, 1977; Wendt, 1999;
Lebow, 2003), where a few countries are nuclear-armed and the rest are
not, it might seem that the Wrongful Intentions Principle – or the Catego-
rical Imperative itself – is insensitive to the ethical requirement to prevent the
evils of nuclear aggression. A rigorous adherence to right action and inten-
tion regardless of the outcomes might have the perverse effect of permitting
evil outcomes. This is one reason advanced by realists to think that Kantian
ideal moral theory is not adequately equipped to deal with the issue of
nuclear security threats and the need for deterrence (Nye, 1986).
By comparison, the Principle of the Morality of Social Institutions
maintains that institutional practices are justified only if they do not
violate absolute rules of justice, equity, and the respect for individual
rights (Lee, 1985). An effective nuclear deterrent requires a systematic
arrangement of people and resources to achieve the strategic objectives of
the institution and to resolve fairly conflicts that arise among its partici-
pants. However, to function effectively, any nuclear deterrence system
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must treat all involved as mere means of state policy instead of moral ends
in themselves. It cannot, for instance, tolerate non-compliance by military
personnel regarding orders to construct, deploy, upgrade or even use
nuclear weapons in case of deterrence failure. If the defense establish-
ment’s needs are at odds with the moral autonomy of its employees, this
principle dictates that the nuclear deterrence institution ought to be
reformed. Otherwise, it should be abolished.
Equally important, nuclear deterrence regimes (especially under doctrines
of mutually assured destruction) use foreign people as coercive instruments
against their governments. During the Cold War, American and Soviet
citizens became nothing more than pawns of state in the great superpower
chess game, as each side held the other’s populations’ hostage to the threats
of destruction to compel abandonment of expansion into the other’s sphere
of influence. Accordingly, the Principle of the Morality of Social Institutions
dictates that there is no significant moral difference between superpower
nuclear deterrence and kidnaping or hostage holding. Since the practice of
nuclear deterrence cannot avoid violations of basic human rights, Kantians
during the Cold War believed that it was always impermissible.
On the face of it, applications of the Wrongful Intentions Principle and
the Principle of the Morality of Social Institutions to instances of recent
nuclear proliferation suggest a continuity of moral assessment across both
world times.18 This is to say, Kantian ideal theory regards both Cold War
and contemporary nuclear deterrence regimes to be motivated by wrongful
intentions and characterized by impermissible uses of countrymen and
foreign people. Thus, despite the significant political and strategic differ-
ences between these two eras of deterrence that might ordinarily affect our
considered moral judgments, a Kantian ideal assessment regards them as
irrelevant.
Now, a realist critique of the Principle of the Morality of Social Insti-
tutions might echo the criticism of the Wrongful Intentions Principle. The
requirement to treat all involved persons according to absolute rules of
human rights, justice, and equity in all circumstances might (perversely)
permit greater evil than a less righteous but more prudent policy. Kantian
leaning ethicists, however, are not wont to convert to realism or con-
sequentialism, for a compelling argument remains that the moral right-
ness and wrongness of actions is a feature of the action itself. Yet, the
realist still urges that the Kantian disregard for consequences (e.g. do
what is right even if the world should come to an end) makes it a dan-
gerous ethic for policymaking.
18 I borrow the term ‘world times’ from Solingen (2007).
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I contend that this realist critique is based on an overly restrictive
reading of Kant. Rather than taking our cues about the morality of
contemporary nuclear proliferation and deterrence from Kantian ideal
theory, I propose to draw on Kant’s discussion of self-defense in LE, MM,
and PP, and in the following section on one formulation of the Categorical
Imperative in GMM whose nonideal elements have been overlooked by
Kantian nuclear ethicists.
Resources for a Kantian nonideal approach to nuclear proliferation
Kant’s views on self-defense may be divided into two categories: self-
defense of individual persons (from which we may draw tentative
‘domestic analogies’ for national defense) and national defense under the
kind of anarchy that corresponds to today’s world.
Individual self-defense
I read Kant as maintaining that every individual is morally obliged to
protect her own life and autonomy.19 This reading is culled from two
passages in LE, where Kant says:
1. ‘The rule of morality, which takes precedence of all rules of reflective
prudence, commands apodeictically and categorically that we must
observe our duties to ourselves; y Man is free to dispose of his
(occupational) condition but not of his person; he himself is an end and
not a means y. Our duties towards ourselves constitute the supreme
condition and the principle of all morality; for moral worth is the worth
of the person as such’. (LE, 120–121)
2. ‘There is nothing more sacred in the wide world than the rights of others.
They are inviolable. Woe unto him who trespasses upon the right of
another and tramples it underfoot! His right should be his security; it
should be stronger than any shield or fortress’. (LE, 193–194)
In these passages, Kant presupposes nonideal conditions and simulta-
neously looks forward to the ideal Formula of Humanity. The duty to
treat oneself as an end and not merely as a means comprises the necessary
and sufficient grounds to protect oneself against hostile neighbors and
19 Two points: (1) Kant also argues that the continuation of life under non-autonomous
conditions may not be worth it. ‘The moral life is at an end if it is not longer in keeping with the
dignity of humanity’ (LE, 156). This implies that the self-defense right is conditioned by the
moral honor or virtue to which it aims to realize. (2) Expressing the problem in this way seems
to strengthen the notion that the necessity principle is in fact a nonideal moral principle.
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criminal aggressors. Yet, for Kant the ultimate condition of personal
security is found in the sacred respect for rights that each individual
should exhibit toward all others. Self defense therefore is best understood
as a reciprocal or mutual relation. When expressed as a speech act, it
signifies the supreme value of human rights as that which ought never to
be compromised.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant takes a slightly different angle.
He indicates that personal security is ideally a matter of law enforcement
over which the state has absolute coercive authority. But, state authorities
are not always capable of protecting individuals from criminal activity. This
incapacity partly constitutes the nonideal conditions with which we are
concerned. In a section titled ‘The right of necessity’, Kant recognizes the
right to use lethal force against a ‘wrongful assailant of [one’s] life’ (MM, 6:
235). Kant implies that lethal self-defense is permissible only when one’s life
is directly attacked by another, and his position here is no different than
Hobbes ([1651] 1968). However, Kant’s placement of necessity into the
Doctrine of Right, which itself is part of his ethics, is significantly different
from the Hobbes’s conception of necessity, and it helps us understand why
Kant claimed that necessity ‘cannot cancel morality’(Kant, 1963: 157). If
morality is not canceled by necessity, then it is possible that necessity itself
a nonideal moral principle.
Of equal interest is Kant’s justification of lying as a method of self-
defense. Kant permits this kind of deception under three conditions: if the
criminal uses coercion against the victim, if what rightly belongs to the
victim is used against her, and if her remaining silent cannot effect her
escape or rescue (LE, 227–228; Korsgaard, 1996: Ch. 5). Lying under these
conditions is not committing an injustice to a criminal aggressor; it is
merely treating him according to a general law of reciprocity. Admittedly,
Kant believes that lying even in these circumstances is a violation of the
civil condition since it puts the rights of humanity at risk. But, it is easy to
overlook a subtle distinction in Kant’s discussion, namely the difference
between putting the rights of humanity at risk and violating them. Thus,
while it is absolutely forbidden to violate the rights of humanity, it might be
necessary sometimes to put them at risk.
One might object here that the weight of Kant’s other writings on lying
challenges the case I am trying to build. Kant notoriously argued in more
than one place that a ‘well-meant lie’ is a violation of legal duty, and it
violates moral duty by bringing about the condition that declarations (of
the type advanced by the lie) are in general not believed.
y if you by a lie prevented someone just now bent on murder from
committing the deed, then you are legally accountable for all the
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consequences that might arise from it. But if you have kept strictly to the
truth, then public justice can hold nothing against you, whatever the
unforeseen consequences might be. (RTL, 8: 426–427)
Kant imagines a case in which a well-meaning friend tries to protect an
intended victim by telling a lie to an assailant, and yet unanticipated turns
of events make it to where the assailant finds and murders the victim (who
had left the house and gone in the direction the murderer took by virtue of
the friend’s directions). For Kant, the friend can be held responsible in
court for the unintended death of the victim, which his lie helped to cause.
Kant argues that only by utter truthfulness could this friend be absolved
from any responsibility for the victim’s death.
Yet, it must be emphasized that Kant’s example in RTL is qualitatively
different from that cited in LE. For Kant, a well-meaning lie used in the
defense of another has different implications for moral and legal responsi-
bility than one told in self-defense. The latter kind of lie, if the criminal
aggressor believes it, deters and prevents wrongdoing against oneself. The
result is that one’s rights are protected without the need to violate the
aggressor’s rights. The former kind of lie, if believed, does not necessarily
prevent wrongdoing and most likely merely delays it. In other words, the
former kind of lie does not necessarily result in the securing of human rights.
Admittedly, critics might still find Kant’s view on the former kind of lie
objectionable, for it means that altruistic Germans that lied to save Jews in
WWII are somehow guilty of violating absolute moral or legal requirements.
And I am inclined to agree with the critics on this matter, but Kant’s argu-
ment against well-meaning lies in defense of another is not relevant to the
matter of lies told in personal self-defense. And it is this kind of lie that
matters for domestic analogies regarding the nuclear self-defense of states.
Unfortunately, the fact of nonideal conditions makes it impossible to
sometimes avoid putting humanity’s rights at risk in the pursuit of legit-
imate self-defense. This is just what any nonideal principle is constructed
to do, to help actors facing injustice and without recourse to lawful
solutions to conform their conduct as closely to the moral ideal as is
practically possible. A corollary maxim thus might be formulated: use
only those modes of self-defense that remain within the bounds of reci-
procity as conditioned by a wrongdoer’s offense.20
My analysis so far shows that Kant permits an individual’s right of self-
defense to include actions that avoid or deflect aggression, while lethal
20 For additional argument in support of the claim that even well-meaning lies in other
people’s defense are consistent with the Formula of Universal Law, see Nell (1975). Note:
Onora Nell has gone by Onora O’Neill since the 1980s.
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acts are permissible only if another poses an immediate survival threat.
In contrast, Kant proscribes all acts of private vengeance and enmity in
the name of self-defense, although individuals retain the right to hate
those who act hatefully against them (LE, 209–214). For Kant, enmity is
‘an express disposition to do harm to another’ that is conceptually distinct
from the attitude of hatred, and vengeance is a personal act of enmity that
seeks to repay evil for evil outside of legal authorization. Neither enmity
nor vengeance is consistent with one’s duties to oneself or others, and in
some cases they count as aggression itself. Put slightly different, enmity
and vengeance are inconsistent with the principle of reciprocity as con-
ditioned by the wrongdoer’s offense, while expressing hatred is not
inconsistent.
National defense under anarchy conditions
Kantian nonideal theory recognizes that conceptions of and commit-
ments to national interest drive national security policy in today’s world.
But, it should be emphasized that Kant’s nonideal theory is a bridge
between this world and that world governed by moral legitimacy and
public right. Just as Kant regarded indirect duties (e.g. to treat animals
humanely) as tutors in the service of ideal duties (e.g. treating humans
humanely), Kant regards the duties of public right that nation–states
bear as a condition necessary to the construction of long-term security
and peace.
Kant contends that an international state of nature is a mutual relation
of constant war, which necessarily constitutes a wrongful condition (MM,
6:343; PP, 8:349). Each country has a self-defense right, which is identical
to the right to go to war (MM, 6:346). Even so, Kant disagrees with
Clausewitz that the logic of warfare is that of unlimited violence (Walzer,
[1977] 2000: 23). Warfare must always leave open the possibility of
leaving the state of nature and entering the rightful condition of a pacific
federation (MM, 6:347). Thus, Kant permits standing armies as a tem-
porary instrument to deter or respond proportionally to aggression (PP,
8:345). On the other hand, no hostile act during war is morally permis-
sible (or even instrumentally rational!) if it undermines the trust necessary
to establish a future peace (PP, 8:346).21 It is this tension between per-
mitting the existence of armed forces for deterrence and the requirement
21 It is important to note, from a historical viewpoint, that the United States use of atomic
weapons on Japan in WWII did not preclude a long peace between them, nor did the threats of
mutual assured destruction preclude the significant peace between the United States, Russia,
and China following the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus, we arrive at a counterintuitive
hypothesis – that atomic mass destruction is not sufficiently hostile to necessitate its absolute
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to forego hostile actions that undermines future trust that directly relates
to our current inquiry. Since a (vastly) weaker or disadvantaged state
might not be capable of effective defense without recourse to deception,
we want to know if, for Kant, permissible uses of deception include the
issuance of nuclear deterrence threats where the credibility of the bluff
depends upon the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The Formula of Universal Law
Kant’s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative – that is, the For-
mula of Universal Law says: ‘Act only in accordance with that maxim [or
moral rule] through which you can at the same time will that it become a
universal law’ (GMM, 4:421). A few lines later, Kant refines this formula
to say ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a
universal law of nature’, where ‘nature’ is understood in its most general
sense to include the physical and social worlds (GMM, 4:422). For Kant,
then, the Formula of Universal Law is used to determine if a maxim (i.e. a
proposed moral rule) could regulate our conduct without contradiction or
exception. Of the three formulations of the Categorical Imperative in
GMM, this one is the nonideal formulation (Nell, 1975: Ch. 4; Kors-
gaard, 1996: Ch. 3). Accordingly, it is by this formulation that maxims
regarding national defense by means of deception are to be examined.
Earlier in GMM, Kant had contrasted the ‘counsels of prudence’, regarded
by IR realists as the most appropriate method of policy formation and reg-
ulation, and the commands of (moral) law that are categorical, uncondi-
tional and necessary to obey22 (4: 415–420). For Kant, counsels of prudence
‘cannoty command at all’ (4: 418) because their validity depends upon the
desirability of the objectives, the capabilities of the actors involved, and other
such contingencies. In contrast, commands of (moral) law ‘must be obeyed,
that is, must be followed even against inclination’ or advantage (4:
416–417). Kant elaborates in some detail:
y the categorical imperative alone has the tenor of a practical law; all the
others can indeed be called principles of will but not laws, since what it is
necessary to do merely for achieving a discretionary purpose can be
regarded as in itself contingent and we can always be released from the
precept if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional
proscription on Kantian terms. What this means for a Kantian analysis of nuclear deterrence is
what I try to tackle in the latter part of the paper.
22 Of course, the question over if an actor actually obeys an unconditional command of law
is a separate issue.
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command leaves the will no discretion with respect to the opposite, so that
it alone brings with it that necessity which we require of a law. (4: 420)
The central point here is the difference between contingent and necessary
moral ends. We may be released from any ‘command’ of prudence if
we give up on the project or objective. To give up on a project or objective
is to tacitly accept that it was not morally necessary. However, we
may never rightfully give up on that which, on Kant’s view, reason
commands unconditionally, which is to say ‘commands universally’.
Thus, Kant maintains that each individual person should always preserve
their physical existence even if it seems that death is preferable, or speak
truthfully to others even if great inconvenience can be avoided by lying (4:
423). In short, the Formula of Universal Law reveals that a maxim that
cannot be willed to become a universal law of nature is inconsistent with
moral right and duty in as much as it entails a formal contradiction: the
actor wills both that (a) the maxim ought always to be followed and (b)
the maxim ought to be followed only some of the time.
Now, one could admit that (a) and (b) are contradictory but still wonder
‘Where does (a) come from, and why should any actor be committed to it?’
Given the points made above on the contingency of prudence and the
necessity of rational morality, we can infer that (a) originates in the
imperative’s form – that any maxim that passes its test is one that ought
always to be followed by its addressees. In addition, the Formula of Uni-
versal Law makes any maxim that passes its test binding on all relevant
actors. This means that, even if a solitary actor proposed the maxim for
herself alone, the universality condition makes it authoritative for any other
similarly situated actor insofar as it is regarded as a ‘universal law of
nature’. It is for these reasons that any maxim of the form of (b) does not
pass the test.
To the best of my knowledge, previous scholarship in Kantian nuclear
ethics assumes that the ideal/nonideal theoretic distinction maps onto that
between reason and prudence (see e.g. Churchill, 1983; Donaldson, 1985;
Lee, 1985; McMahan, 1985; Tucker, 1985). Accordingly, the Formula of
Universal Law has been taken as a principle of Kantian ideal theory.
I believe this move assumption is mistaken. Christine Korsgaard convin-
cingly argues that Kantian moral theory is a ‘double-level’ theory:
The formulas for Humanity and the Kingdom of Ends provide the ideal,
which governs our daily conduct. They are not applicable in contexts of
evil, which can require that we depart from the ideal in order to secure
the greatest instantiation of justice that we can. The formula of Uni-
versal Law provides the point at which morality is uncompromising
(Korsgaard, 1996: 154).
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The Formula of Universal Law therefore recognizes the fact of non-
compliance with moral, civil, and international legal requirements, and it
draws a line beyond which no claim of exclusion or suspension from duty
is justified. For, if morality is to be action guiding at all (Nell, 1975), it
cannot be so only in contexts of relatively good compliance with norms.
Having now explicated the Formula of Universal Law in some detail,
the question is how it might apply to Kant’s remarks on lying in self-
defense and specifically on the permissibility of nuclear deterrence lies for
national defense. Recall that Kant acknowledged that lying in self-defense
is always a threat to the moral order. No one could rationally will that all
persons everywhere be permitted or required to tell falsehoods, for the
integrity of social interaction and especially contractual relations (RTL, 8:
245–246) would unravel if the duty to be truthful was abandoned. Thus,
it is impossible to prescribe universally that (a’) it is always acceptable to
lie to gain advantage and (b’) it is never acceptable for another to lie when
they are advantaged and I suffer loss. However, in nonideal conditions it
could be rationally willed that every individual be permitted to lie to
prevent their autonomy rights from being trod underfoot by liars and
assailants (Nell, 1975: Ch. 5). If lying to a lying assailant does him no
injustice, morality is not contradicted by the nonideal rule that permits
deception in those instances while proscribing it generally.
Contrast the foregoing with the inconsistency of any maxim that pre-
scribes the necessity of assured destruction as a form of nuclear ‘self-
defense’. To imagine such a maxim becoming universal law is to imagine
that no contradiction exists between (a’’) always permitting the use of
nuclear weapons on another country’s entire population in response to an
attack and (b’’) proscribing the same by any other state in self-defense
against one’s own cities. But, the contradiction is plain. The Kantian
universality test restricts the scope of nonideal principles to those that are
impartial. Yet, a’’ is not something that can be affirmed simultaneously
with b’’.
Applying Kantian nonideal theory to contemporary nuclear proliferation
As I read Kant, a state’s right to go to war entails the right to threaten to
go to war. It follows, first of all, that officials have the right to form the
corresponding intentions necessary to wage or threaten war. Second, they
have the right to acquire the armaments needed for warfare or for making
their threats credible. But, living in the 18th century, Kant could not have
conceived that states would become capable of creating, stockpiling, or
using nuclear weapons to prevent or respond to the kind of aggression
experienced in the 20th and 21st centuries. Yet, if it can be shown that
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Kantian nonideal theory permits nuclear deterrence under certain condi-
tions, the prima facie right to acquire nuclear weapons can also be shown.
To make the following discussion appropriately general and yet
applicable to contemporary cases (e.g. Iran), I shall refer to two hypo-
thetical states that coexist in the kind of anarchy that corresponds to
today’s international system. Let us call them ‘Aspirant’ and ‘Rival’.
Aspirant is a nuclear threshold state in a ‘troubled’ or insecure region and
Rival is their antagonist that also has nuclear weapons aspirations (e.g.
Syria), actually has nuclear weapons (e.g. the United States), or is allied
with an economically developed and nuclear-armed state (e.g. Israel). For
our purposes, Aspirant and Rival are signatories to the NPT. Admittedly,
Aspirant’s pursuit of nuclear weapons by itself says nothing explicitly
about their intentions. But this does not mean that Aspirant’s intentions
are entirely opaque, especially if their pursuits are accompanied by pub-
licly advanced reasons or threats against Rival. A valid Kantian assess-
ment of Aspirant’s nuclear pursuits therefore depends a great deal (but not
exclusively) on the intentions that motivate their deterrence threats
against Rival.
It is important at this point to distinguish two kinds of target for
Aspirant’s deterrent threats: Rival’s military centers and government/
population centers. It is equally important to distinguish two kinds of
corresponding intentions: an intention to carry out the threat should
deterrence fail and one to never carry out the threat. Table 1 depicts the
conceptual territory of targets and intentions:
Each number in Table 1 specifies a policy option for Aspirant that pairs
a threat target with a threat intention. Option (1) pairs the reprisal threat
against military centers with the intention to carry it out if deterrence
fails. Option (2) pairs the threat against military centers with the intention
to never carry it out. Option (3) pairs the threat against population/
government centers with the intention never to carry out the threat. And
option (4) pairs the threat against population/government centers with the
intention to carry it out. One should note that Table 1 does not relate
a game theoretic matrix of choices with associated payoffs. Its purpose is
to map the range of policy options available to Aspirant. Specifically,
Table 1. Range of policy options – deterrence targets and intentions
Threaten/intentions Carry out Never carry out
Military centers 1 2
Population/government centers 4 3
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Aspirant can undertake any of the four options individually or a limited
set of combined options: (1) and (4), (2) and (3), or (2) and (4). Two
combined options – (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) – are excluded inasmuch as
they are contradictory and could not be implemented at the same time.
And, one combined option – (1) and (3) – is equivalent to (1) only.
Now, an intention to carry out nuclear deterrent threats in the context of
deterrence failure is an intention to engage in nuclear war. Analysis of this
category obviates the need to apply the Kantian view on lying in self-
defense, since Aspirant means to make good on retaliatory threats. Let us
evaluate the only three options. The first is Aspirant’s policy to carry out
deterrent threats on military and population/government centers. This
choice is tantamount to desiring Rival’s annihilation, which violates the
doctrine of right (MM, 6: 235) as well as the nonideal proscriptions against
enmity and vengeance in LE. On Kantian terms, the Formula of Universal
Law would not pass any maxim that corresponds to a policy of compre-
hensive nuclear reprisal. To see why, let us assess two varied formulations.
One might be called a maxim of overkill: ‘In all instances of nuclear
deterrence failure, the victim of aggression must retaliate by means of
nuclear strikes against the aggressor’s military, political, and population
centers’. This maxim is easily rejected, for it is the clearest case of state
annihilation, that Kant prohibits absolutely. However, it might be
compared to a maxim of strict nuclear reciprocity: ‘In all instances of
nuclear first strikes, it is the duty of the victim to retaliate in kind’. One
of the most challenging cases would be where Aspirant suffers a nuclear
first strike on one military center and one industrial center. The maxim
dictates that the retaliatory nuclear strike must hit one of Rival’s military
and industrial centers. In many cases, acting on this maxim falls sig-
nificantly short of state annihilation, even though it probably involves
high levels of civilian casualties. It might even promote the re-estab-
lishment of deterrence in as much as it reinforces the expectation that
nuclear escalation will be punished and de-escalation will be rewarded
(Gauthier, 1984). However, a Kantian assessment of this maxim is lar-
gely independent of these consequentialist concerns. Recall that the
Formula of Universal Law draws an uncompromising bottom line where
even Rival’s wrongdoing cannot justify Aspirant’s maxim of strict
nuclear reciprocity. The indiscriminate destruction of human life, even
when Aspirant and Rival destroy only one military and industrial center
apiece, cannot be willed as a universal law of nature. And if Aspirant
really intended to allow strict nuclear reciprocity only for themselves
and no one else, such partiality cannot be reconciled with the Formula of
Universal Law’s requirement to transform a maxim into a law that
obligates all relevant actors.
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The same analysis applies to any policy of carrying out deterrent threats
solely against population/government centers. However, for Aspirant to
carry out deterrent threats solely against military centers seems prima
facie consistent with Kant’s view on the right of national defense, and it
parallels some applications of just war theory on the problem of limited
nuclear warfighting (Ramsey, 1962; Orend, 2000). Once acquired, a low-
yield nuclear device might annihilate one or more of Rival’s army divi-
sions, naval task forces, or air-force bases, severely crippling its capacity
to continue to aggress. More importantly, a maxim that corresponds to
this intention appears to pass the universality test. Aspirant could in prin-
ciple assent to a rule that permits all nuclear-armed states to threaten and
carry out exclusively counterforce nuclear reprisals, much in the same way
that nationalist morality permits all states to use conventional force in self-
defense.23 This isn’t to say that Rival can read off Aspirant’s intentions from
its nuclear procurement behavior. And this is not to say that in the process of
nuclear miniaturization required to produce these weapons that Aspirant
might not retain its larger nuclear devices. It is to say, though, that Aspir-
ant’s maxim on this point can be imagined without formal contradiction.
Moreover, were Aspirant to miniaturize its arsenal and then verifiably
decommission or destroy its larger devices, Rival might come to behave that
Aspirant had abandoned any policy of mutually assured destruction in favor
of a policy of severely limited counterforce warfare.
There are, however, significant constraints on this nuclear defense right.
Intending to carry out threats against counterforce targets would be
impermissible on Kantian nonideal principles if they led to countervalue
strikes or a counterforce escalation that entailed massive collateral damage.
In conventional warfighting, the just-war doctrine of double effect permits
unintended and limited killing of noncombatants on grounds of military
necessity. However, at some point an escalation of counterforce strikes
cannot avoid ruining the surrounding eco-systems and in turn injuring or
destroying innocent human life. It would then be false to claim that Aspirant
only intended to do good by undertaking counterforce strikes of this kind. It
would also be false to claim these counterforce strikes were necessary evils,
and that the goodness of the outcome made the cost of the counterforce
strikes worth it (Orend, 2000: 164).
Barring these prohibiting conditions, though, my reading of Kantian
nonideal theory suggests that Aspirant’s choice to carry out deterrent
threats strictly against military centers of Rival is permissible. Given the
23 Admittedly, using nuclear weapons in this way violates a central maxim of Joseph Nye’s
nuclear ethics – to never treat nuclear weapons as ordinary weapons.
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special nature of the nuclear threat environment, Kantian nonideal theory
permits Aspirant to do all that is consistent with the reciprocity corollary
to defend itself. And if Aspirant truly faces a nuclear threat from Rival,
their NPT commitments do not clearly over-ride their national defense
obligations. Indeed, the inclusion of Article X into the NPT is evidence
that states parties are already committed to this position.
What of the other policy options? The most salient options are that
Aspirant might levy deterrent threats against Rival’s military or/and their
government and population centers but never intend to actually strike any
target or never intend to strike any population or government centers. The
important practical difference between this set of possibilities and those
already considered is that Aspirant expresses a threat against both mili-
tary and government/population centers. The important moral difference
is that this latter set of options embodies the intent to deceive. What
moral assessments now follow on the basis of Kant’s views on lying in
self-defense and the Formula of Universal Law?
First, we recall that the purpose of lying to criminal aggressors is to deflect
or avoid aggression and that lying to liars or assailants is not an injustice to
them. If, for instance, North Korea’s nuclear threats are bluffs, they never-
theless are regarded by some to have helped dissuade America (i.e. the Bush
Administration) from launching anticipatory military strikes against Pyo-
nyang (Smith, 2006: Ch. 4). This kind of deterrent threat by itself then
appears at first glance to be permissible within the bounds of reciprocity.
That said, the lie told to the criminal aggressor in Kant’s example does not
include a threat of harm. In contrast, the promise of harm that the threat
conveys – which is an attitude Aspirant intends to cultivate even though he
does not actually intend to carry out the threat – activates Rival’s hostility
and the corresponding difficulty in trust building. Such threats are incon-
sistent with Kant’s nonideal Sixth Preliminary Article that proscribes acts of
hostility ‘as would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future
peacey’ (PP, 8: 346). In plain terms, a persuasive nuclear deterrent threat
that Aspirant secretly intends to never carry out still inflicts a determinate
harm that mere deflection or avoidance of aggression does not, namely the
construction of an existential insecurity in the threatened state and, to the
extent the threat is made public, the creation of existential fear among
people that are ‘ends in themselves’.24
Still, given the kind of anarchy that is in today’s world, it would be a
mistake to think that Kant would absolutely forbid the practice of using
24 Yet, this judgment is not a necessary one, as the history between United States and Japan
suggests.
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deception in nuclear deterrent threats. Assuming that Rival previously
uttered a credible existential threat to Aspirant, and assuming that
Aspirant is not an ally of a country with a nuclear umbrella of its own, a
nuclear deterrent lie told to Rival is not unjust, even if it generally
increases the tendency to not believe statements of this kind. A credible
deterrent lie prevents or deflects aggression without causing further injury.
In the same fashion, the reciprocity corollary advanced in fourth Section
establishes the possibility that, given a world of nuclear-armed states that
have already instituted nuclear deterrent regimes and have made hostile
threats of their own, Aspirant might reasonably conclude that advancing
persuasive nuclear deterrent lies is necessary for national defense. And to
establish the credibility of those threats, it would be morally permissible
for Aspirant to acquire nuclear weapons even though the NPT forbids it.
Conclusion
Kant believed that necessity could not cancel morality. This is because
necessity is itself a nonideal moral principle. However, necessity does not
justify any indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in the name of
self-defense. Necessity is not amoral nationalism run amok. Kantian
nonideal theory permits states to advance and carry out a narrowly aimed
deterrent nuclear threat against counterforce targets that would match the
degree to which aggression has been or is likely to be committed, but
proscribes deterrent threats of mass destruction or annihilation. To carry
out these latter threats would violate the ideal and nonideal requirements
of human dignity and reciprocity. More interestingly, Kantian nonideal
theory conditionally permits the practice of issuing threats of nuclear
reprisal that are never intended to be carried out. It follows that Kantian
nonideal theory cannot absolutely proscribe Aspirant’s nuclear weapons
acquisitions as a means of deterring Rival, but the conditions under which
Aspirant may acquire them are significantly restricted.
The implications of these conclusions reach into both theory and policy.
I cannot discuss any of these at length at this point, and most are worthy
of extended examination in their own right. I shall therefore close by
briefly discussing three implications. First, I believe this analysis corrects
the tendency among Kantian leaning nuclear ethicists to draw exclusively
from his ideal theory. If I am right, Kantian nonideal theory accom-
modates realist concerns without converting to full-blooded realism or
moral consequentialism. It retains the emphasis on moral autonomy and
the rightness of action independent of mere consequence. More to the
point, Kantian nonideal assessments provide the scope conditions for
justified nuclear proliferation while requiring both Aspirant and Rival to
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exercise their rights consistent with reciprocity and the duty to achieve
perpetual peace.
Second, my analysis reinforces the argument against IR realism’s
attempt to divorce the concepts of necessity and morality. On my view,
the necessity principle is a nonideal moral principle because it affirms the
pre-legal and historical conviction that bonds of national existence have
intrinsic value, that obligations towards fellow citizens can often take
precedence over the obligations to strangers when these conflict, and that
national security is a necessary condition for the realization of other
goods. It also shows that Kantian nonideal theory can meaningfully apply
the necessity principle properly bounded by reciprocity to conditions of
nuclear threat. That Kant incorporates the necessity principle into his
nonideal theory also strengthens the notion that morality and politics are
intimately related.
Finally, in terms of policymaking my analysis implies that we ought to
not uncritically assume that all instances of contemporary nuclear pro-
liferation are morally unjustified. It is yet to be determined whether an
Iranian (or, hypothetically, an Egyptian, Saudi, or Turkish) nuclear
weapons program is justified; the point is that it might be justified on
Kantian nonideal grounds. Were the entire justification for an Iranian
policy of acquiring nuclear weapons to rest on, say, Islamic ethics, Wes-
tern leaders might conveniently dismiss it. However, that this proposal
finds conditional support in Kantian nonideal theory casts Western pol-
icymakers into a familiar yet challenging normative context that they
ought not to dismiss too readily. Therefore, as Kant had recommended to
the European monarchs of old (8: 369–370), it seems to me that the
nonproliferation policy community would do well to consult with nuclear
ethicists, just as the medical community has done regarding the critical
care of patients.
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